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CHICANAS/OS, "LIBERTY" AND ROGER B. TANEY
Guadalupe T Luna*
Get but the truth once uttered,and 'tis like
A star new born, that drops into its place,
And which, once circling in its placid
round, Not all the tumult of the earth can
shake'

I. INTRODUCTION

This essay brings us back to 1848, a period in the nation's history
in which property rights were closely identified with the "blessings" of
liberty. 2 Barely sixty years had elapsed since the Constitution had declared
protection from the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property ... " with
private property afforded the protection of due process of law or
compensation before it could be taken for public use.3 Similarly, the
United States Constitution had only recently promised to "secure the
Blessings of Liberty," providing a means to resist overly intrusive and
arbitrary governmental action.4

* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois School of Law. J.D., 1985-University of
Minnesota.
I. SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIROF ROGERBROOKETANEY(I 872). Taken from the introductory
comments of the Memoir, at x.
2. This presentation incorporates from my investigations on the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and analysis of the case law in which grantees of Mexican descent attempted to defend
their property interests. For a broader analysis of the issues encompassing land grant adjudication
see Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicanas/osLand Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a
Naked Knife, 4 MICH. J. RAcE & L. 39 (1998). More specifically this presentation at the AALS
expands from a concept essay developed in Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities ofRace, 53
U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 (1999).
3. U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. V (1791). Amendment XIV, ratified July 28, 1868, came
after the war between the U.S. and Mexico. Both as a pre-condition to ending the war and as shown
by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, grantees were assured the protection of their property
interests. See HuNTER MILLER, 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 255 (1937) [hereinafter "TREATIES&OTHER ACTS"]. During the hearings on
whether to ratify the Treaty, Secretary of State Buchanan emphasized that the Constitution and laws
of the United States and "the very nature and character of our institutions" amply guaranteed the
rights of their property and liberty interests. Id. at 256. See e.g., United States v. Yorba, 68 U.S.
(I Wall) 412 (1863).
4. U.S. CONSTITUTION, pmbl.
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In linking liberty with property, a vast amount of powerful legal
rhetoric underscores the goals of the Constitution.' Freedom from
governmental restraint, for example, maximizes the life, liberty, and
property interests associated with full citizenship.7 Furthermore, the
constitutional ability to participate in federal, state and local government
complements property and land ownership. Key provisions such as "the
pursuit of happiness" enumerated in the Declaration of Independence
underscore certain inalienable rights. A significant amount of study
directed to the dichotomy between governmental action and private
property ownership emphasizes the attendant but inherent conflict riddling
the relationship between governmental actions and property holders.
In contrast to investigations centering on governmental takings,8
this essay addresses a period in which race, class, and gender defined the
citizenship status of a racially identified group and their relationship with
governing and legislative bodies. "Liberty and security were so interconnected in eighteenth century political thought that today it is almost
impossible to untangle them." 9 Land ownership and related liberty
interests eluded the nation's earliest Chicanas/os with adverse
consequences for their successors.' Accordingly this examination of

5. For the purposes of this review property is defined as "proprietary rights in land and
things annexed thereto" as constituting "real property." See HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INTERESTS INLAND 1 (1970).
6. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 70 (1988) ("[L]iberty in the eighteenth century was a concept of constitutional law
...Liberty and security were so inter-connected in eighteenth century political thought that today
it is almost impossible to untangle them .. ");see also U.S. CONSTTION, amend. V (1791);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (citing Chicago, B. & Q R.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)). This essay adopts the interpretation of liberty advanced by
application of the U.S. Constitution and rights attendant to citizenship status. For example, John
Marshall interpreted liberty to mean "private security" or the "security of the individual's natural
rights and, more basic yet, of his 'interests."' ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF JOHN MARSHALL 3 (1968).
7. See H.N. HIRSCH, A THEORY OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAND MINORITIES 41 (1992)
("Liberty provided security because it protected property, and property make [sic] people
independent of government."). Compare Gregory S. Alexander, Time andPropertyin theAmerican
Republic Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 305 (1991) ("To Americans of the eighteenthcentury republican culture ... the common law signified a tradition of political practice of
resistance against foreign 'tyranny' to protect 'liberties' that were both ancient and natural.") with
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). Cohen states:
"Montesquieu's view that political laws must in no way retrench on private property because no
public good is greater than the maintenance of private property, was echoed by Blackstone and
became the basis of legal thought in America." Id. at 8.
8. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
9. HIRSCH, supra note 7, at 41 (quoting REID, supranote 6, at 70).
10. For present analysis of land ownership, see e.g., U.S. GAO:01-330, THE TREATY OF
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liberty tethers Chicanas/os with Roger B. Taney during Taney's time as
United States Attorney General in the Florida region and his term as
United States Supreme Court Justice." The evidence reveals an inherent
contradiction drawn primarily along racial and class lines linking, the
earlier Florida period with contemporary times. Examining the Taney
period for its possible implications on Chicanas/os yields interrelated
points flowing from this historical framework.
First, a legal framework and jurisprudence emerge from litigation
by the once Attorney General and thereafter Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. During both Taney's tenures as Attorney General
in Florida and as a Chief Justice, Chicanas/os witnessed the loss and
diminishment of their liberty interests 12 despite protections promised by
several treaties, Anglo-American law and legal actors. Under these
circumstances, property and liberty interests irreconcilably conflicted with
law, politics and ethnicity.
While rating Supreme Court justices is deemed "far from an exact
science,"' 3 the opportunity presented here allows examining the impact of
Justice Taney on the nation's earliest Chicana/o population and its
connection with liberty interests.'4 More specifically, reviewing Taney's

GUADALUPE HIDALGO, DEFINITION AND LIST OF COMMUNITY LAND GRANTS IN NEW MEXICO,
Exposure Draft (Jan. 2001). For a report on the condition of land grants and a survey conducted by
the United States, see 145 CONG. REC. H285 (Feb. 2, 1999), Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty Land
Claims Act of 1999; William Carey Jones, Report On the Subject of Land Titles In California
(1850), in MEXICAN CALIFORNIA (ed. Carlos E. Cortes (1976)); Sam Howe Verhovek, South Texas
Families' Land Fight,A Battle for the Ages, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 20, 1997, at MS.
11. The term "Chicana/o" references individuals of Mexican descent residing in the United
States. Terms of preference, however, are largely recognized as "self-designations." See GENARO
M. PADILLA, MY HISTORY, NOT YOuRS (1993).
12. For an interpretation on the specific number of cases litigated at the United States
Supreme Court level, see Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, One HundredFifty Years of Solitude:
Reflections on the End of the History Academy's Dominance of Scholarship On the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo,5 S.W. J.L. & TRADE AM. 83 (1998). The litigation in which Roger Taney
served as Attorney General for the Florida region is directly linked to the jurisprudence of the
property cases in the former Mexican territories following the war'between the United States and
the Mexican Republic. These connections accordingly allow an opportunity in which to view yet
another measure of Taney's constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Roger B. Taney has generated a
realm of scholarship. See generallyCARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935). Yet the focus
on Taney's influence on litigation involving land grant disputes and its connection to state law
embellishment remains primarily undeveloped.
13. William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: FactorsThat Influence JudicialReputation, 79
MARQ. L. REv. 401,403 (1996).
14. This point advances recent scholarship exploring the intersection of race, class, gender
and other categories with legal theory and the liberty interests of the nation's citizens. A
consciousness of the period gives a broader perspective on Chicana/o culture and legal history in
large part obscured by the "dominant Anglo Protestant culture's point of view." Carmen Ramos
Escandon, Alternative Sources to Women's History: Literature,in BETWEEN BORDERS, ESSAYS ON
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land grant adjudication law facilitates a means to assess how judicial
interpretation effectuated the legal and political identity of Chicanas/os,
both historically and in the present day. The reasoning behind his
decisions, the promotion of state over federal interests, stands in direct
contrast to the Marshall constitutional pantheon promoting federal law.
While "far from an exact science,"" critics and evaluators of Supreme
Court Justices nonetheless assert that a Justice's worth is measured in part
by various factors. According to Professor Bernard Schwartz, "Supreme
Court greatness is virtually synonymous with influence on the law."' 6
Comparing the relative influence of Taney's earlier legal period and his
promotion of states' interests with a later period shows the development
of law that produced unfavorable results for Chicanas/os. The matter of
Taney's "constitutional understanding"' 7 ultimately expands when
considered in the context of intersectionality specific to race, law and
gender.
The goal of this endeavor is not limited therefore to linking the
nation's earliest Chicanas/os with Chief Justice Roger B. Taney. An
additional component of this article sets forth a time in which the nation's
earliest Chicanas/os sought to defend their property interests and
emphasizes a key point in understanding Taney's purpose in promoting
state over federal law.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo transformed the legal standing
of the former Mexican citizens by providing a legal status comparable to
the dominant population.' In contrast, the property jurisprudence
developing from earlier periods disallowed the liberty and enjoyment
associated with property rights. From the negotiated and promised
covenants, Chicanas/os expected the full protection of their liberty and fee
interests comparable to all the rights, privileges and benefits recognized
under American law.' 9 By judicial emphasis, however, the reverse
transpired with tremendous costs to Chicana/o liberty interests. This period
accordingly provides a measure in which to reconcile a definition and
meaning of liberty and property as it applies to Chicanas/os. It also allows
a venue in which to examine the role of their racial and class background
MEXICANA/CHICANA HISTORY 201 (Adelaida R. Del Castillo ed., 1990); see also CHICANA
FEMINIST THOUGHT, THE BASIC HISTORICAL WRITINGS (Alma M. Garcia, ed. 1997).

15. Ross, supra note 13, at 403.
16. Bernard Schwartz, Supreme CourtSuperstars: The Ten GreatestJustices,31 TULSA L.J.
93, 157 (1995).
17. ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL

(1968). The term

can be found describing John Marshall in the Preface of the text at vii.
18. See MILLER, supra note 3, at 256 (quoting James Buchanan).
19. For a discussion of the extent to which the legal system presented a biological theory
dividing the races of immigrants into categories, see IAN F. HANEY L6PFz, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE

(1996).
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when considered in the context of a legal relationship. Specifically
underscoring this inquiry on liberty and property is the action of a United
States Supreme Court Justice
identified in the present as one of thejudicial
20
"Superstars" of the nation.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was an international peace
agreement that terminated the war between the United States and the
Mexican Republic. 2' As a pre-condition to terminating the war, the United
States promised in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to protect the liberty
and property 22 interests of the nation's earliest Chicanas/os 23 choosing to
remain on their property in the annexed territories. 24 The conflicts
generated from this Treaty and the resulting connections between Taney
and Chicanas/os dominate this investigation.
Nonetheless, this review is not limited to a historical glimpse into
a long neglected past. Nor is its intent restricted to "revising" imprecise
interpretations of Taney's Supreme Court opinions or to laying blame on
Roger B. Taney for the totality of legal sins that confronted Chicanas/os
attempting to defend their property interests. In the alternative, the intent
is to unveil a complexity of law lying dormant within the pantheon of
Taney literature. Examining the connections between the Taney periods
and the present allows a comparative analysis of the meaning of liberty as
it applies to a racialized group within a particular contextualized
framework. In this framework liberty is identified with attributes flowing
from citizenship status. Although long buried in ancient law, the role
designated individuals of Mexican and Hispanic descent reveals yet
another layer burdening their right to enjoy their liberty interests not only
during the annexation of the former Mexican territories but long into the
present.

20. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 93.
21. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb.
2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter "Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo"]. Ratification took
place in Queretaro, Mexico, May 30, 1848, and proclamation made July 5, 1848. For an
interpretation of the political events in Alta, California preceding the war, see, UnitedStates v.
Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1261 (D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,664).
22. See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 21, at 929-30.
23. See generally RICHARD SMITH ELLIOTT, THE MEXICAN WAR CORRFSpONDENCE OF
RICHARD SMITH ELLIOTr 64 (ed. Mark L. Gardner & Marc Simmons 1817).
24. Prior to the war, men and women of Mexican and Spanish descent owned estates of
varying sizes throughout the present American Southwest. This followed from Mexico's
independence from Spain in which Mexico encouraged the settlement of its northern domain by
various colonization laws. See Decree of the Mexican Congress of August 18th 1824, Respecting
Colonization in Ferrisv. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 634 (1858).
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Part II of this Article offers a few comments on Roger B. Taney
and his early connection with land grant law as an Attorney General of the
United States. In order to increase our understanding of liberty and its
application to Chicana/o issues, Part II also examines an earlier Treaty and
its implications on subsequent land grant adjudication in the former
Mexican provinces. Part III addresses the appointment of Taney as Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court and the Taney legacy of
promoting state over federal interests. Taney's appointment ushered in a
period of fidelity to constitutional principles and minimal governmental
intrusiveness, 5 a political development yearned for by some but which
failed to protect the property rights of Chicanas/os. Part IV explores the
connection between liberty and property for Chicanas/os, analyzing the
law of this period as a means of entrenching and justifying the unequal
treatment of Chicana/o property grantees.26 Last, Part V demonstrates the
difficulties emerging with traditional paradigms for understanding land
grant adjudication and the attendant and present effects ofthese paradigms
on Chicana/o disenfranchisement.

25. During this period Blackstone's commentaries and its rhetoric protective of private
property surfaced. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 16-17(1973). See
generally Lucas v. Southern Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n. 7, (1992)
(proclaiming that the fee simple interest in land has a "rich tradition of protection at common law");
Hans W. Baade, "OriginalIntent" in HistoricalPerspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L.
REv. 1001, 1003 (1991) ("The 'originalists' (or 'interpretivists') contend, basically, that [the U.S.
Constitution] should be interpreted through the historicalascertainment of the actual, or at least the
presumed, intent of those who drafted it in 1787 and adopted it by 1789 - the 'Founding Fathers,'
as they are known colloquially.)" (citations omitted).
26. This approach is similar to that taken by LatCrit theory, a method of introducing and
cultivating knowledge on the Latina/os condition in law. LatCrit theory is not addressed as a "mere
genre" within mainstream law, but a new way of looking at the law. Legal history shows that new
forms of fairness, justice, and transformation occur with newer combined forms ofjurisprudence.
See, e.g., Harold J.Berman, Towardan IntegrativeJurisprudence:Politics,Morality,History, 76
CALIF. L. REv. 779 (1988).

CHICANAS/OS PROPERTY RIGHS WITH ROGER B TANEY

II.

TANEY AND EARLY LAND GRANT ADJUDICATION

"Wherever Taney was personallyknown, people andpress
reactedenthusiasticallyto his appointment"'
"Sir: -Ihave greatsatisfactionin obeying the President's
instructions to inform you that he has this day appointed
you Attorney-Generalof the United States .... ,28
Sir:... I accept the appointment, andprayyou to convey
to the Presidentmy respectful acknowledgementsfor this
distinguishedmark of his confidence... 29
Underscoring this essay is a glimpse of liberty as it applies to a
racialized group within a particular contextualized framework. In this
context liberty is identified with the full attributes flowing from citizenship
status. To consider the form of liberty allowed Chicanas/os requires
examining the linkages between Florida and later land grant adjudication
in the former Mexican territories.
A. Taney as Attorney General
From the numerous articles and investigations exploring the Taney
periods, several points stand clear. First, several writers describe Roger B.
Taney during this time in his career as a man of superior intellect and a
passionate reader of the law. His reputation accordingly allowed favorable
press as evinced upon his appointment to United States Attorney General."
For example, the Baltimore media provided:
A lawyers surpassed by none in the country, a gentleman
whose name is identified wherever it has been heard with
every thing that is pure and elevated in character, - a ripe
scholar, a sound, discreet, orthodox politician, gentle in
manners and uniformly courteous in deportment. - Mr.
Taney will be found a safe and firm counsellor, and valuable
public servant of whom the state which sends him and the
union which receives him may be justly proud."

27. WALKER LEWIS, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, A BIOGRAPHY OF ROGER

B. TANEY, 122

(1965).
28. TYLER, supra note 2, at 173. This is an excerpt from his offer of appointment, written on
June 21, 1831 by Edward Livingston, Secretary of State.
29. LEwIS, supra note 27, at 121. This is an excerpt from Taney's acceptance letter to
Livingston, written on June 24, 1831.
30. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 173.
31. LEWIS, supra note 27, at 122-23.
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The Richmond Enquirer added in its July 8, 1831, announcement
that Taney "is a lawyer of fine talents and of high standing at the bar of the
supreme court ... We shall hail his accession to'the cabinet as a solid
benefit to the country. 32
Second, Taney took the oath of office on July 20, 1831, where he
performed as Attorney General "for a little over two years., 33 As the
nation's chief law enforcement officer, Taney "was required to advise
personally every bureau of the federal government, plus the President and
his Cabinet, and also to represent its interests in negotiations and in
litigation. In between, he must conform to the demands of politics,
including exposure to a besieging army of place-seekers. ' 34 The position
of Attorney General allowed Taney to represent the American Republic in
a wide range of legal matters including interpretation of treaties negotiated
between nation states. His involvement in land grant adjudication prepared
him for his role following the annexation ofthe former Mexican territories
now comprising the American Southwest.
B. FloridaLand GrantAdjudication
Long before the United States war with Mexico, Spain ceded
Florida to the United States through the Adams-Onis Treaty.35 Under this
Treaty, the United States promised to protect the property holdings of the
former Spanish residents remaining in the Florida region. 36 The case law
interpreting the Treaty and claimants' asserted land ownership status
provide several evidentiary considerations as to the legal standing of the
former Mexican citizens claiming under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
For purposes of this review, a key ruling favorable to the grantees in
Florida introduces several compelling considerations in later land grant
adjudication law. "If a Justice disregards the judgments of those who
preceded him, he invites the very same treatment from those who succeed
him. A Justice who wants to preserve the value of his own coin must not
devalue the coin of his predecessors."37 This point surfaces in examining
land grant adjudication in Florida.

32. Id. at 123.
33. BEN W. PALMER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, STATESMEN OF THE LAW 165 (1939). Palmer
also reveals that Taney, the new Attorney General, acted as Secretary of War for a few days until
the new secretary Governor Lewis Cass arrived. Id. at 165.
34. LEWIS, supra note 27, at 124.
35. See Treaty with Spain, Feb. 22, 1819.
36. See id.
37. Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent,the Amendment Process,andEvolutionin Constitutional
Doctrine, I I HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 70 (1988)

CHICANAS/OS PROPERTY RIGHTS WIT ROGER B. TANEY

United States v. Percheman31 is important to understanding the
distinctive, specific character ofthe relationship between the United States
and grantees of Mexican descent for three important reasons. First, the
litigation involved a Treaty purportedly negotiated between two
sovereigns. 9 Second, Congress modeled subsequent land grant procedures
in California and other Southwestern regions after Florida land grant
procedures. Third, and critical to the purpose of this review, the decision
involved Roger B. Taney, the United States Attorney General who later
served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during the California land
grant adjudication period. 4'
Perchemaninvolved an early interpretation of the Treaty between
the American Republic and Spain and its relationship to Florida land
claims.4 ' In the Percheman decision, Taney opposed the land grantee's
claim of ownership in his role as Attorney General.42 As a key
governmental official in the interpretation of land grant adjudication law
in Florida, Taney's expertise interpreting the peace agreement was
invaluable in his role representing the nation against the claimed property
interests of the former Mexican and Spanish citizens.
In Percheman,the dispute involved an 1815 land grant awarded to
Sergeant Juan Percheman.43 Percheman is identified as a sergeant of "a
squadron of dragoons." As in a later process adopted in California,
Florida required claimants of land grants to produce their claims of
ownership.45 The Florida law obligated claimants to satisfy governmental
"tests" in recognizing their property interests. Confirmation, however, did
not necessarily result in a status denoting fee simple absolute. As in later
land grant periods, the United States contested and challenged the validity
of a confirmed grant.
Examining a key decision in which Taney as Attorney General
represented the United States demonstrates a consistent theme that also

38. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
39. See id. at 57.
40. As to Taney's appointment to Attorney General of the United States, see LEWIS, supra
note 27, at 121.
41. See generally MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW
MExico (1994).

42. See Percheman, 32 U.S. at 59.
43. See id. at 53. For an initial investigation of the connections between the Percheman
decision and subsequent land grant law in New Mexico; see EBRIGHT, supra note 41. The New
Mexico land grant adjudication process occurred after the California land grant procedures and
involved a different process and time frame. Compare EBRIGHT, supra note 41, with Botiller v.
Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889).
44. Percheman, 32 U.S. at 54. The petition of the original grantee provides that "Don Juan
Percheman, sergeant of the squadron of dragoons of America" is included in the opinion. Id.
45. See id. at 54-56.
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surfaced in governmental objections against Chicana/o land ownership in
later land grant adjudication litigation. In United States v. Percheman,
Taney employed a number of objections to the confirmed status of the
Percheman grant.4 The Attorney General's objections stemmed interalia
from (a) the lack of authority on the part of Spanish officials to grant the
claimed tract of land; (b) the failure to properly record the grant; (c) the
disallowance of "copies" of the grant as inadmissible evidence; (d) a
limited reading of the Adams-Ons Treaty in English; (e) conquest law
entitling the United States to the land; (f) the receipt of the grant under
fraudulent circumstances; and (g) a strict interpretation of the Treaty
which rendered the purported claim of ownership illegal.47
Chief Justice Marshall rejected the claims of the Attorney General
on a number of points, instead relying on various aspects of international
and domestic law.48 The Percheman opinion ruled in sum that (a)
interpretation of the Treaty was not limited to an English translation of the
Spanish text; (b) the intent of the Treaty's negotiators was crucial; (c) the
granting officers had the authority to grant land; and (d) the court had
jurisdiction. 49 The ruling demonstrates the process ofrecognition ofprivate
property in a conquest. In essence, Justice Marshall's concern for property
rights of former Spanish citizens led him to the particularities behind the
Treaty negotiation, the specific intent of its negotiators, and their reliance
on constitutional and international law principles.
Taney's disregard for precedent from the Marshall court in
Perchemenshows Taney's possible intentions."0 Justice Marshall "became
Chief Justice at a time when the establishment of judicial and federal
supremacy was essential to national development."'" Taney, in the
alternative, emphasized "the preservation of the reserved powers of the
states."52 The protection of states' interests in federal/state jurisprudence
remains consistent with the experience of land grantees. Cases after cases
denied the former Mexican citizens protection of their property interests
at federal levels. The alternative would have protected their claims and
would have recognized the supremacy of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo

46. See id. at 57-58.
47. See id. at 60-62
48. See id. Specifically, Chief Justice Marshall used the Law of Nations, the Adams-Onis
Treaty, and the laws of Spain. See id. at 65-70.
49. See id. at 76-98.
50. As to the nature of precedent during this phase of the nation's legal history, see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 17.
51. LEWIS, supra note 27, at 276.
52. Id. For an analysis of the Taney and Marshall Courts, see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 81-100 (1960).

CHICANASIOS PROPERTY RIGH7S WITH ROGER B. TANEY

over state action. Barring Chicanas/os in this fashion permitted federal law
matters to lapse into the realm of state law jurisdiction."
Yet another important emphasis reveals a moment in time in which
theories were tested and thereafter promoted at great cost to the grantees
of Mexican descent without reconciling the effect of the theories on
constitutional dictates. The arguments posited in Percheman against the
grantee bore fruit in the Mexican and Spanish land grant adjudication
following the United States war with the Mexican Republic. This land
grant decision shows how pre-determined results hindered Chicana/o
possession of some of the nation's richest natural resources.
III. TANEY'S INFLUENCE ON LAND GRANT ADJUDICATION
'
"Who is the most hatedAmericanjudge?"54

A. Taney's Appointment to the Supreme Court
Justice Taney's nomination to Associate Justice following the
death of Chief Justice Marshall provoked controversy and heated debate.
The Senate, responding in part to Taney's support of Jackson's antinational bank position, rejected his appointment. This defeat followed a
rejection of his nomination to Secretary of the Treasury seven months
earlier."
Despite these failures, President Jackson nonetheless forwarded
Taney's name to the Senate "as his nominee for the office of chief
justice."56 The criticism generated from this controversial nomination
ranged from misguided hype to disapproval grounded in truth. Taney's
opposition toward a national bank and his support of President Jackson,
another opponent of a national bank, fueled the fire of criticism. Other
charges ranged from various "insinuations or definite charges that he
lacked intelligence, honesty, natural ability, that he had imbibed Jesuitical

53. Linking the particularities of land grant adjudication law with earlier periods not only
comports with newer jurisprudential thought that places Latinas/os in the center of academic
inquiry, but it also yields evidence of the nature of shifting and arbitrary rulings that hampered land
ownership for Chicanas/os over time. See Colloquium, Latina/o Ethnicities,CriticalTheory, and
Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practicesto Possibilities,9 LA RAZA
LAWJ. 1 (1996); Symposium, LatCritTheory: Namingand Launchinga New Discourseof Critical
Legal Scholarship,2 HARv. LATINO L. REv I(1997); Symposium, Difference,Solidarity,andLaw:
BuildingLatinalo Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 UCLA CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1

(1998).
54. PALMER, supra note 33, at 145 (referencing the Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1856), decision).
55. See id.
at 184.
56. Id at 185.
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tendencies from his religion."57 In a public speech, Daniel Webster called
Taney a "pliant instrument of the president." Although the debates over his
nomination lasted several months, ultimately Roger B. Taney became
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
B. Taney's Legacy on the Court
According to scholars, rating the value of a Supreme Court
Justice's tenure "is a useful exercise insofar as it offers a means of
defining the qualities that Americans value in their Supreme Court
justices. '"" Professor Ross also believes in assessing Justices:
"Retrospectively, the evaluation of justices offers insights into legal
history since distinctions among the relative significance of various judges
provide a clearer perspective about which judicial decisions and
philosophies
have most profoundly influenced the Court and the
59
country.

Although evaluating Supreme Court Justices "is obviously far from
an exact science, ' several qualities emerge as determinants of ajustice's
reputation and "defin[e] 6 1the qualities that Americans value in their
Supreme Court justices.",
Professor Ross' enumeration of several factors that range from,
inter alia,the impact on legal development, connection between ideology
and politics, longevity of tenure, intellectual ability, attention from
historians, leadership and influence on the court, and quality and quantity
of opinions allow a template in which to consider Roger B. Taney as a
Supreme Court Justice. 62 Nonetheless, Professor Ross asserts, "Some of
these factors obviously influence some critics more than others . .. these
factors are more useful in framing a theoretical model of an ideal justice
rather than identifying the factors that actually mold judicial reputation in
practice. 63 Professor Bernard Schwartz asserts that yet another way for
rating and comparing "Supreme Court greatness" is by assessing who
"employed the authority of the ermine to the utmost." The Taney
decisions have influenced two major legal aspects of subsequent land grant
adjudications and related jurisprudence.
One manner in which Taney's decisions have wielded great
influence is his emphasis on states' interests over federal interests. Justice
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 184.
Ross, supra note 13, at 402..
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at402.
See id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Schwartz, supra note 16, at 157 and 159.
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Taney'sjudicial opinions are closely identified with shifting "[t]he balance
of federal power versus state power."65 The leading law setting forth state
authority to "regulat[e]... commerce for its own ports and harbours, and
for its own territory" in order to ensure the "safety or convenience of trade,
or for the protection of the health of its citizens" 6 establishes authority
within the realm of state jurisdiction. Although some would argue
otherwise, the norms advanced in characterizing the Taney period stand in
marked contrast to the Marshall court.
A second example of Taney's legal impact involves the DredScott
decision and its effect on property, federal/state relations, citizenship
standing and original intent theory. The Dred Scott decision is long
recognized as "one of those watershed cases, impacting not only the Court,
but the entire nation."67 Scholars have long emphasized that the DredScott
ruling and rationale overshadow Taney's tenure.68 Others characterized
Dred Scott as an "eccentric" decision69 with still others asserting that his
"judicial career [was] of singular interest and of great value to America."7
As they contend, Dred Scott "made us forget that [Justice Taney] was an
upright judge, a man of singular purity of life, stainless integrity, high
ideals; that
he was amiable, gentle, humane, and of calm and equable
71
temper."5
The power wielded by Chief Justice Taney and his regard for the
nation's earliest Chicana/o population' shaped the land grant procedures
and the outcome of the California Land Act of 1851 ("Act of 1851").
Through this Act Congress promulgated land grant procedures in a manner
not unlike that used in the Florida land grant cases. 73 The Act of 1851
required grantees claiming land from the Spanish and Mexican periods to
demonstrate proof of ownership. Third parties inside and outside the
United States were permitted to challenge a grantee's claim of
65. Anthony B. Ching, Travelling Down The Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez, New
York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 99, 105 (1993).
66. Id. (quoting Thurlow v. State of Rhode Island, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (1847)).
67. Hon. Michael Daly Hawkins, Judges on Judging: Dining With the Dogs: Reflections on
the Criticism ofJudges, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1353, 1357 (1996).
68. See PALMER, supranote 33, at 145.
69. Ross, supra note 13, at 430.
70. PALMER, supra note 33, at 14546.
71. Id. at 146.
72. In his memoir Justice Taney tells us: " I have come to the conclusion that, if the public
should be indifferent and careless as to my life and character, the work may derive some interest
from its connection with men and things as they existed in the generation which has now passed
away. I belong to that generation, and lived and acted in it and with it. And the history of my life
is necessarily associated with the manners, habits, pursuits, and characters of those with whom I
lived and acted." TYLER, supra note 1, at 18-19.
73. See California Land Act, 9 Stat. 631 (1851). For case law summary of the Land Act of
1851; see Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
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ownership,74 and a special tribunal of commissioners heard the claims."
Under the Act of 185 1, courts considering land grant claims were required
to follow the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the law of nations and the
"laws, usages and customs from which the claim derived., 76 Appeals
resulting from rejected claims fell to the various federal courts.
Justice Taney is viewed as one of the greatest Supreme Court
judges, the DredScott holding notwithstanding." The law he developed
recognizes state law and internal governance instead of the national
perspective encouraged by the Marshall Court. The first case brought
before the Supreme Court under the Act of 1851 shows the instrumental
effect of this land grant process on the condition of Chicanas/os.
In United States v. Fremont,7 the first case deemed critical to the
land grant process, the claimant was a former Mexican national who had
been instrumental in the conquest of the former Mexican Province known
79 The claimant had received the purported grant in
as Alta California.
violation of Mexican colonization law and procedures.'0 He had failed to
perform any conditions attached to the grant, demonstrating neither
possession nor occupancy and failing to produce documentation of
ownership.8 In sum, the grant did not comport with the standards
employed during the land grant period to demonstrate proof of ownership
either under Mexican or American law. 2
As Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Roger B.
Taney authored the Fremontopinion. 3 Justice Taney rejected Marshall's
nationalist approach and ignored the required application of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, the law of nations and the "laws, usages and customs

74. For a summary of the land grant process in case law; see United States v. Morillo, 68 U.S.
(1 Wail.) 706, 709-10 (1863).
75. See Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478,492 (1865) ("They have there established a
special tribunal, before which all claims to land are to be investigated.").
76. California Land Act, supra note 73, at § 11.
77. See Schwartz, supra note 16.
78. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854).
79. See id. at 548. The United States officially declared war against the Mexican Republic
on May 13, 1846. The assertions of Fremont and other insurgents that their property was under
siege by the Mexican Republic set the groundwork to justify the invasion of Mexico. As foreign
nationals, Fremont and his band of insurgents were governed by Mexican law and as such their acts
constituted treason in violation of the laws in force at that time. For accounts of this myth, see
Morehead v. United States, 17 F. Cas. 729, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 9792) ( "American settlers
in the Sacramento valley were a small band, menaced with extermination or expulsion from the
country...."); Translation of the Mexican Congress Respecting Colonization, Aug. 18, 1824, art.
I (repealed 1836), reprintedin Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 634 (1858).
80. See Fremont, 58 U.S. at 547-552.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 552.
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of the government from which the claim is derived."" By disregarding the
statutory text of the Act of 1851, Taney upheld the grantee's claim to
ownership. 5 Therefore, the court accomplished what the political process
could not do directly, validating an illegal grant purportedly belonging to
a foreign national under Mexican law.
For grantees, the Fremont decision introduced a time of
jurisprudential instability regarding land ownership claims and illustrated
the political influences of the powerful." After Fremontland grantees who
were not particularly influential or powerful faced a number of additional
hurdles to securing their land, including charges like those leveled in
Percheman.
IV. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
FOR CHICANAS/OS

"Since the middle ages, and probably before, ownership of land
meant status in society."87 Land and power as forms of wealth are closely
identified in promoting life, liberty, property and the interests of the state.
As a group, Chicanas/os' racial status limited their liberty interests and
also caused intense racism and subordination long into the contemporary
period."8
Any connection between liberty, property and the "blessings" of
American law soon lapsed into an abyss of insurmountable legal
challenges for Chicanas/os. Liberty for Chicanas/os hinged on whether
they could manage to thwart a number of challenges, including one law
that, upon payment of a $1,000 bond, third parties could file charges'
against grantees in the name of the United States. In confronting the
signatory to the covenants in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, grantees

84. Id. at 553. See California Land Act, supra note 73, at § I1.
85. See Fremont, 58 U.S. at 565.
86. For a discussion of one of the first cases decided under Fremont and its comparison to
Fremont,see note attached to United States v. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. 266, 273 (C.C.D. Cal. 1859)
(No. 14,713). Initially after Fremont, at the federal claims level several grantees received
confirmation of their claims. Nonetheless the United States directly challenged their confirmed
status. For a couple of references, see United States v. Cazares, 25 F. Cas. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1855)
(No. 14,761) (granting claim of land because, although the documents have been lost, the court
believes that they are genuine); United States v. Bernal, 24 F. Cas. 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,
581) (granting claim of land despite the government's allegations that the title documents are
fraudulent).
87. Samara F. Swanston, EnvironmentalJustice and Environmental Quality Benefits: The
Oldest, Most PerniciousStruggle andHopefor Burdened Communities,23 VT. L. REV. 545, 549
(1999).
88. For the role of law and its role in constructing the status of race as an "other," see
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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faced United States actions in issues ranging interaliafrom whether they
possessed granting documents, whether Mexican officials possessed
authority to grant awards, whether Mexican registries referenced the
specific grant,89 whether their specific grant involved fraud,9" and whether
they had performed all conditions attached to land grant awards. 9 Without
consistent application of federal law to the land grant process, grantees
thereafter became vulnerable at the state level. The legacy that began with
the Fremontdecision demonstrates Taney's promotion of state interests in
contrast to the promises made by the United States to the grantees.
The case law established under Taney furthermore reveals a time
in which Chicanas/os were formally constructed as outsiders and allowed
only a marginalized status within the hierarchy of law. Within a short
period of time, for example, almost all of Chicana/o property vested in
non-Chicana/o hands or proved of great value to the public domain of the
United States. 92
In contrast, dominant legal theory asserts that dispossession
resulted neither from a breach of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo nor
from violations of United States' promises. According to this line of
"reasoning," without documents, recording93 or other primary evidence
establishing ownership, American law and its legal institutions could do
nothing but reject claims of ownership over a property interest. Public

89. See generally Fuentes v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 443, 448 (1859) (requiring that
"[tlhe title is to be recorded in the proper book"); United States v. Widow & Heirs of Berreyesa, 64
U.S. 499 (1859) (denying additional acreage to the claimants because the record with the Mexican
government had not been corrected to reflect the increased amount).
90. See generally United States v. Bernal, 24 F. Cas. 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,581)
(discussing at length the possibility that, as the U.S. alleges, the grantee could have committed
fraud); United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 70 (1878) (granting a land claim because,
although it was likely created via fraud, the court will not re-open the case to examine fraud unless
the Attorney General brings suit).
91. See generally Pico v. United States, 19 F. Cas. 590, 591 (D. Cal. 1855) (No. 11,127)
(proposing that "[i]t may... be considered that on the breach of the conditions, the title which had
vested in the grantee reverted ipso facto to the government, without anyjudicial proceeding or other
act on the part of the government manifesting its intention to take advantage of the forfeiture.").
92. See generally Palmer v. United States, 18 F. Cas. 1047 (D. Cal. 1857) (No. 10,697)
(discussing public domain).
93. Part of the process under Mexico law in perfecting a claim required that the governor
forward the title to the Assembly to perfect the title. Due to the circumstances of the terrain,
distance from the Mexican interior made it difficult to ensure timely perfection of the claim. See
United States v. Osio, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 273, 280-81 (1859) ("Where no record evidence is
exhibited, the mere proof of handwriting by third persons, who did not subscribe the instrument as
witnesses, or see it executed, is not sufficient in this class of cases to establish the validity of the
claim, without some other confirmatory evidence."); United States v. Sutter, 27 F.Cas. 1368 (N.D.
Cal. 1861) (No. 16,424) (denying a claim based on lost and burnt documents); United States v.
Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1261 (D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,664) (rejecting a claim based on invalid signatures
on the grant and the absence of records of this grant in government archives).
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records of land grant law also reveal that attendant charges of carelessness
and/or fraud were frequently levied toward claimants unable to provide
documentation of the property interest in controversy.94 Public records
further show the destruction of Mexican public archives and land grant
documents, making it difficult to reconcile charges of carelessness on the
part of grantees unable to access and demonstrate the validity of their
interests by the lack of documentation.
In contrast, the dominant legal record conceals the impact of the
land grant cases on Chicanas/os with grantees returned to their former
status as Mexican foreigners and in the process relegated to the periphery
of traditional law.95 In sum, faulting Mexican law and culture for
dispossession obscures the fact that neither treaty provisions nor the
"invaluable blessings" of American law kept property in the hands of the
grantees.96
The Fremontdecision, moreover, failed to reconcile the re-writing
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with the objections of its Mexican
negotiators. 97 Furthermore, the decision disregards the role of land grant
legislation98 in shifting the burden of proof onto grantees to demonstrate
ownership of their property even where ownership had rested with a
particular family since time immemorial. 99 Fremontalso overlooks the use

94. Compare Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 437 (1865) (accusing the
grantee of bringing "a case less of misfortune and accident than of a fraudulent kind") with United
States v. Bale, 24 F. Cas. 968 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,504) (confirming a grant because records
missing from the governmental office were destroyed during a political takeover). Each province
throughout the former Spanish and Mexican territories experienced the conquest in different forms.
95. Extensive delays also facilitated dispossession. For example, jurisdiction disputes
surfaced in which federal district courts did not obtain jurisdiction until the Act of 1860. See United
States v. Rodriguez, 25 F. Cas. 821 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 14,950). Waiting for the
jurisdictional disputes to resolve added yet additional pressures on Chicanalo landowners seeking
to thwart the actions of incoming homesteaders and squatters. Also, governmental officials were
charged with destroying Mexican documents held by officials immediately following the war. See
United States v. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. 266, 267 (C.C.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 14,713) ("possible that
some espedientes [titles to land] have been lost. Colonel Fremont appears to have removed several,
which were lost in the mountains."). Furthermore, "natural disasters" curiously erupted on or near
the location where the first Board of Commissioners heard land grant claims in San Francisco,
generating allegations over the loss ofland grant books and other documents. See Fuentes v. United
States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 443, 451-52 (1859).
96. MILLER, supra note 3, at 255 (quoting Secretary of State James Buchanan as to the nature
of the nation's legal institutions).
97. The negotiators representing the Mexican Republic included Jose Joaquin de Herrera,
Jose Bernardo Couto, Brigadier General Ignacio de Moray Villamil, and Miguel Atristain.
98. See California Land Act, supra note 73, § 11.
99. See United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452, 456 (1895) (explaining that the land in
question, a plot in what is now New Mexico, was granted to Mexican citizens in 1833 by the
Republic of Mexico in order that the grantees might colonize the area). Although California
sustained three periods of conquest, the majority of the land distributed during this period occurred
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of violent, state-supported campaigns to displace grantees and the role of
the United States in challenging confirmed grants.'0° The rhetoric of
Fremont promotes a reliance on dominant theory without regard to
linkages between race, class, gender and the law.' 0 '
Absent consistent protection at the federal level, challenges at the
state level confronted grantees. Grantees met accusations of fraud,
competition for land by third parties falling outside the land grant
process,0 2 force and violence,'o° actions in ejectment, and attorney
partition actions for compensation. The tangles in public law that
encouraged the settlement of the West also produced jumpers and
squatters, adding to the political influences of the day. The emphasis on
states' interests exposed grantees to further state actions and decreased the
likelihood of property vesting in the hands of Chicanas/os. Several who
managed to hold onto their property faced attorney partition actions and
state taxes, challenges which eventually forced involuntary alienation.
Without property, Chicanas/os lacked the means to challenge arbitrary
governmental policy and the ability to use the political process to resist
governmental actions. To the present, the nation's Chicanas/os face
systematic legal limitations disallowing them the means to challenge
disparate conditions."°

alter Mexico won its independence from Spanish governance in 1821 and after secularization of
the Spanish mission system in 1836. Secularization of the Spanish missions freed up formerly
owned mission lands for distribution to settlers. During this time, the indigenous population
sustained yet further land losses. This early period connecting the conquest with Spanish and
Mexican governance is in need of further historical study.
100. For examples of the United States appealing grants confirmed by the land grant
adjudication process, see United States v. Guerrero, 26 F. Cas. 52 (N.D. Cal, 1855) (No. 15,269);
United States v. Palomares, 27 F. Cas. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 15,990); United States v. Briones,
24 F. Cas. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,649).
101. See generally United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 352,358 (1863) ("the United
States have never sought by their legislation to evade the obligation devolved upon them by the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to protect the rights of property of the inhabitants of the ceded
territory, or to discharge it in a narrow and illiberal manner").
102. See generally United States v. Morillo, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 706, 709 (1863) (dismissing
case because United States laid no claim to the land in dispute, so the disagreement between the
two private parties became "a mere contest between individuals as to who is the real owner of the
land"). "The [Act of 1851] declares that the final decrees rendered in [land adjudication]
proceedings, and the patents issued under them, shall be conclusive between the United States and
said claimants only, and shall not affect the interest of third parties." Id. at 709.
103. For an account of the violence confronting land grantees by squatters, military personnel
and other agents of the state; see e.g., LEONARD PITr, THE DECLINE OF THE CALIFORNIOS, A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-SPEAKING CALIFORNIANS 1846-1890, at 32-37, 84-86 (1970).

104. For examples of intimidation tactics employed by police officers following Mexican
Americans to voting poll booths, see White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-70 (1973); Aranda v.
Van Sickle, 600 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1979). Poll taxes, violence, and literacy tests also were
employed to thwart full citizenship status of the Chicanalo community.
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V. EFFECTS OF LAND GRANT ADJUDICATION ON CHICANAS/OS AND
CURRENT DISENFRANCHISEMENT

In his decision to transfer Florida from Spain, Chief Justice
Marshall reasoned, "The people change their allegiance; their relation to
their ancient sovereign is dissolved: but their relations to each other, and
their rights of property, remain undisturbed."' 5 Yet the evidence shows
that legal barriers disallowed the use and enjoyment of property rights and
thereby deprived descendants of Mexican and Hispanic descent of their
liberty interests.' °6
We are told that Chief Justice Taney's form of judicial reasoning
sought to avoid political issues.0 7 Although silent and vociferous political
issues overwhelmed the land grant adjudication period and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo,' ° Taney managed to ignore the politics and the
suffering of the dispossessed grantees. In the end, his promotion of states'
interests vanquished any fidelity to constitutional principles.
In the land grant adjudication period, Justice Taney refused to
follow judicial precedent that would have produced stable land grant
adjudication law.' 0 9 Instead, his decisions culminated with endless
litigation facing Chicanas/os in seeking to protect their property interests 10

105. Percheman,32 U.S. at 87.
106. For an insight interpreting the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with the claims of Native
Americans see Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: InterculturalJustice and the Discourse of
Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (2000).
107. See LEwis, supra note 27, at 318-36 (noting cases demonstrating Taney's purported
position in avoiding political issues). "I do not doubt the power of this Court to hear and determine
a controversy between states, or between individuals, in relation to the boundaries of the states
where the suit is brought to try a right of property in the soil.... But the powers given to the courts
of the United States by the Constitution are judicial powers and extend to those subjects only which
are judicial in their character, and not to those which are political." Id. at 320 (citing Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts).
108. For a contextualized framework involving the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, see United
States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278,290 (1897) ("The mode in which private rights of property may
be secured, and the obligations imposed upon the United States, by treaties, fulfilled, belongs to the
political department of the government").
109. The argument here does not argue against the Court overruling precedent. The argument
emphasizes that racialization of the Chicana/o took place and intensified over an extensive period
of time. Compare for example, Taney's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford and his reliance on the
historical construct and emphasis on "political family" with his disregard of history in land grant
adjudication law. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
110. See Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889). In Botiller, the Supreme Court
summarized the transfer of sovereignty under the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty:
This was a transfer of the political dominion and of the proprietary interest in this
land, but the government of Mexico caused to be inserted in the instrument certain
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and an exhaustion of the financial resources of grantees. The qualities of
constitutional jurisprudence praised by Justice Marshall in Percheman,the
"interests of fairness [and] efficiency,""' thereafter proved elusive for
Chicanas/os.
Land grant law ignored the jurisprudential value of treaty law and
the California Land Act and rejected universal truths specific to the use
and enjoyment of one's property interests and liberty from overly intrusive
governmental action. For the grantees who lost their land, results of the
land grant process did not promote "enhanc[ing the] social interaction
require[d]" that allows "governments and citizens [to] have a reasonably
settled sense of what they may and may not do.""'
Ultimately, the costs of expediting federal claims to the state level
refuted Marshall's reasoning as in McCulloch v. Maryland."3 As Francis
Stites summarized the McCulloch rationale, "Reason and the supremacy
clause established that the national government, though limited to the
enumerated powers, was supreme within its sphere of action. Any lawful
act by the Congress took precedence over a state law."".4 In the process,
Marshall rejected the idea of the Constitution as "a compact between
sovereign states" and embraced the Constitution as "an instrument of
government created by the people 'in their highest capacity' as sovereign
individuals."'15
Although their land holdings increased the nation's wealth,
Chicanas/os of the present continue to confront intrusion of their liberty
interests. Three aspects of this continual disenfranchisement bear on this
article. First, knowledge of current discrimination is necessary to
completely understand the land grant period and its effects, to correct
misrepresentations and legal practices harmful to Chicanas/os. Continuing
problems also reveal the extent to which the development of state law over
federal jurisprudence and interpretation of constitutional provisions
favored the discriminatory treatment ofChicanas/os. Without the complete

provisions intended for the protection of private property owned by Mexicans
within this territory at the time the treaty was made; and it may be conceded that
the obligation of the United States to give such protection, both by this treaty and
by the law of nations, was perfect.
Id. at 243-44.
111. Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedentthe Amendment Process,and Evolution in Constitutional
Doctrine, I I HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 70 (1988).
112. Id.
113. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
114. FRANCIS N. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL, DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUION at 130; see also
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (IWheat) 304 (1816); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (ICranch)
137, 178 (1803).
115. STrrEs, supra note 114, at 130.
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picture of the land grant period, the nation's legal history blames the
Chicana/o culture and the grantees themselves for their dispossession.
Second, despite attempting to enjoy the liberty interests promised
Chicanas/os in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Chicanas/os in the land
grant period reverted to their status as Mexicanas/os and disallowed the
benefit of law as asserted in the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. Preliminary studies strongly suggest a direct relationship between
the legal attempt to disenfranchise Chicanas/os from the "political family"
and their resulting inability to use and enjoy their liberty interests.
Nevertheless, much work in this vein remains unfinished.1 6 In the present
day, much of the racial group disempowered by the land grant process
remains in poverty and under the whim of political capriciousness.
Third, this essay is grounded in introducing a missing piece of legal
studies on the role of Roger B. Taney. Taney's tenure is often
characterized as promoting federal/state distinctions with an emphasis on
promoting states' interests. The pantheon of Taney literature largely
excludes land grant adjudication law and ignores the social costs incurred
in promoting states' interests. The continued harm created by Taney's
decisions in the land grant cases reveals the lasting effects of his focus on
states' interests.
Legal historians and judicial interpretations further blame Mexican
and Hispanic grantees for the loss of their property rather than examine yet
other factors that led to this injustice. Blaming Chicanas/os allows one to
ignore the failure of purported imprecise constitutional dictates.
Disregarding the racial, ethnic and gendered identity of injured parties
prohibits a more precise understanding of liberty and its attachment to land
ownership. An attitude of denial overlooks the unfairness of shifting the
burden of proof in land grant legislation"' onto grantees to demonstrate
ownership of their property held in some instances since time
immemorial."' Blaming Chicanas/os furthermore discounts the violent,
state-supported campaigns to displace the landowners and the role of the
United States in challenging confirmed grants." 9 This dominant rhetoric
promotes reliance on imprecise law without regard to intersectionality
between race, class, gender and legal precepts, thus revealing the impact

116. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
117. See California Land Act of 1851, 9 Stat. 631 (185 1) § 11. In New Mexico the process
employed through the Court of Private Land Claims differed in that confirmation initially took
place by congress before the land grant process was implemented in that region. See EBRIGHT,
supra note 4 1.
118. See United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452 (1895). See generally Guadalupe T. Luna,
Gold, Souls and Wandering Clerics: CaliforniaMissions,Native Californians,andLatCrit Theory,
33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 921 (2000).
119. See United States v. Guerrero, 26 F. Cas. 52 (1855).
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of racism on the nation's earliest Chicanas/os.
In the alternative, adopting the traditional rationale presented by
dominant theory or other revisionists' 20 places the burden of dispossession
on the grantees. This paradigm hides the complex land grant adjudication
period on dusty bookshelves, away from students and legal historians
seeking to reconcile certain "truths"'' with the disappearance of land from
the hands of the former Mexican grantees. This traditional rationale not
only avoids a fuller analysis of the meaning of linking property and liberty
interests for those holding a subordinate status in the rural economy, but
it also bars development of land grant law as a distinct body of
jurisprudence.122 Finally, this paradigm of blaming the Chicanas/os avoids
linking theory with practice and accordingly leaves subordinated
communities intact.
Without access to land, the grantees of Mexican descent remained
disenfranchised from the political process. Without political liberty,
grantees were kept from participating in legislative actions and political
decisions that defined not only the land grant agenda but also related
legislation,'23 land use programs,'24 and the political process in general.'25

120. Revisionism played a significant role in the conquest of the region. See ANTONIO MARIA
OsIo, THE HISTORY OF ALTA CALIFORNIA, A MEMOIR OF MEXICAN CALIFORNIA (1996) (detailing
the exaggeration of claims in the conquest); ROBERT F. HEIZER & ALAN F. ALMQUIST, THE OTHER
CALIFORNIANS, PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER SPAIN, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES

TO 1920 (1971).
121. The role of universalism and essentialism in law is well documented and beyond the
scope of this essay. See generally Elizabeth Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Religion, Gender,
Sexuality, Race & Class in CoalitionalTheory: A Criticaland Self-CriticalAnalysis of LatCrit
Social Justice Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503 (1998).
122, Contemporary review focuses primarily on urban environments without consideration of
the rural Chicana/o. As to status of Chicanas/os in rural environments, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, THE HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE U.S. SOUTHWEST BORDERLAND, c3.196:P-23/17

(1992); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-40FS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROFILE OF
RURAL AREAS (1993).
123. See People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311 (Cal. 1870) (questioning whether a former
Mexican citizen has met all the sufficient qualifications to run for political office in the U.S.).
124. Compare federal public law as incentives in drawing forth settlers to the newly acquired
territory with homesteaders and squatters encroaching on the land of grantees. Compare Act to
Extend Preemption Rights to Certain Lands Therein Mentioned, ch. 143, 10 Stat. 244 (1853); Act
to Provide for the Survey of the Public Lands in California, the Granting of Preemption Rights
Therein, and for Other Purposes, ch. 145, 10 Stat. 244 (1853); The Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 130,
12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-308 (1988) (160 acre grants to
settlers); as Reclamation Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 527 (1988) with Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S.

238, 252 (1889) (citing Justice Taney's Fremontopinion for the proposition that the earlier federal
laws regarding land adjudication were much less effective than the Act of 1851, partly due to the
broad coverage of the Act over inchoate, equitable, and legal titles). For an example of a land
adjudication decided without the aid of the Act of 1851, see Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U.S. 261

(1888) (detailing contest over land in Texas granted to the family of Pilar Garcia de Sabriego from

CHICANAS/OS PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH ROGER B. TANEY

Due to an unreliable and inconsistent legal system, Chicanas/os ultimately
bore the blame for much of what was lost.
The legacy of Taney's influence on the land grant period shows
that while liberty is closely linked to citizenship, it is also conditioned on
the racial status of the claimant. Into the present day Chicana/o citizens are
viewed as outsiders and are frequently subjected to federal laws that
question their standing in the nation's legal and political fabric. For too
long they have remained primarily outside traditional legal investigations
or regulatory programs beneficial to non-Chicanas/os. Their legacy in land
dispossession and their political treatment as outsiders reveal a host of
opportunities to study the matter of liberty and property and to provide a
means of protection against arbitrary governmental intrusions affecting
race, class, and gender. Within traditional law paradigms, however, the
impoverished Chicana/o communities accordingly remain intact and the
star born here is neither bright nor shining.

Spain in the early 1800s).
125. Grantees were denied not only the freedoms inherent in property ownership but also
political and religious liberty. For information on the consequences of the Conquest on Chicanas/os,
see A Conversation with Antofia 1. Castafieda, A War of Violence and Violations: The
Consequences of Conquest, <http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/mainframe.html> (visited
Feb. 26, 2001) She asserts that "[t]he U.S.-Mexican war, like any other war, was fundamentally
about violence - a violence that did not end once the war ... ended." Id She provides further:
"Ostensibly, the war was about territory, continental expansion, access to the ports of the Pacific,
and access to and ownership of all of the wonderful minerals and riches that were in the subsoil.
The war was about land, labor, and wealth. But it was also about language, culture, race, and
religion. It was about way of being. It was about world view." Id.

